Crude oil and other petroleum liquids |
Natural gas | Coal | Nuclear | Hydro | Other renewables | Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Primary energy production (quad Btu) | 0.14 | 0.01 | 0.76 | 0.00 | 1.02a | 1.94 | |
Primary energy production (%) | 7.4% | 0.7% | 39.2% | 0.0% | 52.6% | 100.0% | |
Primary energy consumption (quad BTU) | 1.99 | 2.15 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.04a | 6.81 | |
Primary energy consumption (%) | 29.2% | 31.6% | 0% | 0% | 15.3% | 100.0% | |
Electricity generation (TWh) | 0.31b | 103.09b | 97.3b | 0.00 | 55.18 | 61.22 | 317.10 |
Electricity generation (%) | 0.1% | 32.5% | 30.7% | 0.0% | 17.4% | 19.3% | 100.0% |
Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics database |
Facility (status) | Capacity (Tcf per year) | Total length (miles) | Supply regions | Destination | Details | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Trans Balkan natural gas pipeline (Operating since 1987) | 0.5 | Over 600 | Russia through Ukraine and Moldova primarily via the Shebelinka-Dnipropetrovsk–Kryvyi Rih–Rozdilna-Izmail (SDKRI) Gas Pipeline | Sofia, Bulgaria and Istanbul, Türkiye | It transits Romania and Bulgaria. Physical reversed flows were utilized for the first time in 2022 to Moldova, although reversed virtual flows first shipped to Ukraine in 2015 because Russia favors Turkstream.37,38,39 | ||
Tabriz-Dogubayazit/Ankara (Operating since 2001) | 0.5 | 1,600 | Tabriz, Iran | Türkiye | Flows were halted or diminished in early 2022 and 2023.40,41 | ||
Blue stream (Operating since 2003) | 0.6 | 750 | Russia | Türkiye via the Black Sea | Russia reported record-high exports via Blue Stream in 2021.42 | ||
South Caucuses Pipeline (SCP) (Operating since 2007; expanded in 2018) | 0.9 (originally 0.3) | 430 | Azerbaijan | Georgia to Türkiye (TANAP) | It follows the route of the BTC oil pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to the TANAP. | ||
Interconnector Türkiye-Greece-Italy (Operating since 2007) | 0.4 | 180 | Azerbaijan, Russia, and Iran | Greece | The Türkiye-Greece interconnector started operations in 2007; little progress has been made on extending the line through Greece and to Italy. | ||
Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) (First section operating since 2003; Syria-Türkiye segment TBD) | 0.4 | 630 | Egypt | Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Türkiye | An extension to allow deliveries to Türkiye and Europe is planned.43 | ||
Nabucco pipeline (Türkiye-Austria pipeline) (Canceled 2013) | 1.1 | 2,400 | Azerbaijan (formerly Iran) | Georgia, Türkiye (via TANAP), and Southeast Europe (via Bulgaria) | It was canceled due in part to Azerbaijan’s preference for TAP.44,45 | ||
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) (Operating since 2019) | 0.6 | 1,150 | Azerbaijan (SCP) | Türkiye and Europe via Greece (TAP) | It is Türkiye’s longest pipeline. The Bulgaria Nabucco pipeline extension was canceled, and there are plans to expand to 1.1 Tcf. | ||
Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) (Operating since 2020) | 0.4 | 540 | Azerbaijan via TANAP and SCP | Italy, Bulgaria (via IGB), and Southeast Europe | Construction is underway to expand to 0.7 Tcf capacity; it was built mainly to carry natural gas from Azerbaijan via the SCP expansion and TANAP. The Greece-Bulgaria bridge (IGB) was recently completed.46 | ||
Turkish Stream - line 1 and 2 (Operating since 2020; expansion proposed) | 1.1 (0.6 each) | 570 | Russia | Türkiye and Bulgaria | Türkiye is currently the only source of natural gas from Russia outside of Ukraine with no flow from Yamal-Europe and Nord Stream.47,48 | ||
Persian gas pipeline(Canceled) | 1.4 | 2,100 | Iran | Southeast Europe via Türkiye | It is a former plan to expand flows from Iran to Europe. | ||
Iraq-Türkiye(Proposed; potentially canceled) | 0.4–0.7 | -- | Northern Iraq | Türkiye and Southeast Europe | Türkiye continues to negotiate with the Kurdish Regional Government and the Iraqi government; although no agreement has been reached, BOTAŞ has begun extending the domestic natural gas transmission system to the Iraqi border. | ||
Interconnector Türkiye-Bulgaria (ITB) (Operating since 2022) | 0.1 | -- | Azerbaijan (via TAP and TANAP) | Bulgaria | Bulgaria has been importing more natural gas from Azerbaijan than Russia, which was previously its nearly sole source.49 | ||
Eastring (Proposed) | Up to 1.4 | 500 | Slovakia and Northeast Europe | Southeast Europe and Türkiye | It would be open access, under EU regulations, and would run from eastern Slovakia, across Hungary and Romania, connecting to an upgraded Trans Balkan line in Romania or Bulgaria.50 | ||
South Stream (Canceled) | 2.2 | 560 (offshore) | Russia | Türkiye and Southeast Europe | It was canceled in late 2014 and replaced with Turkish Stream. | ||
Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Turkey, 2017; |
Facility (status) | Capacity (million b/d) | Total length (miles) | Supply regions | Destination | Details |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan | 1.2 | 1,100 | Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan | Türkiye to Ceyhan oil porta | It is used as an alternative for Russia’s oil and infrastructure. |
Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Operating since 1976) | 1.6 | 600 | Kiruk (Northern Iraq) | Türkiye to Ceyhan oil porta | A diplomatic dispute between Türkiye and Iraq relating to Kurdish use of the pipeline have temporarily halted flows in 2023.51 |
Iraqi Section of Kirkuk-Ceyhan | 1.5 | 220 | Kirkuk | Fishkhabur (Iraq-Türkiye border) | Iraq’s portion of the pipeline was the target of militant attacks and stopped operating in 2014. The pipeline’s effective capacity was significantly lower than its nameplate capacity prior to its closure. |
Turkish Section of Kirkuk-Ceyhan | 1.5 | 400 | Fishkhabur (Iraq-Türkiye border) | Türkiye Ceyhan oil porta | |
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Pipeline (Operating since 2014) | 0.7 | 250 | Northern Iraq | Ceyhan oil porta via connection to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline at Fishkhabur | A plan to expand the pipeline was canceled in 2021. In early 2023, exports were halted.52 |
Samsun-Ceyhan (Canceled in 2013) | Up to 1.5 | 340 | Russia and Central Asia | Türkiye to Ceyhan oil port | It would have allowed oil to bypass the congested Turkish Straits, but the project was canceled in 2013 because it was deemed uneconomical. |
Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Turkey, 2017 |