

Physical Market Conditions, Paper Market Activity & the WTI-Brent Spread

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I. Outline of Today's Talk

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
- **Provide visual & statistical evidence of breaks in crude oil benchmark price Spreads**
 - ✦ WTI-Brent nearby futures spread = “Landlock” spread + “Transatlantic” Spread + Brent nearby spread
 - ✦ → Question: Which of these three spreads have experienced structural breaks?
 - ✦ → *Robustness checks:* Inland “quality” spread (WTI-WTS) ; Near-dated WTI calendar spread

- **Provide evidence on Economic, Infrastructure and Financial Variables linked to Spreads**
 - ✦ **Demand**-side fundamentals: World, US
 - ✦ **Supply**-side factors: Output capacity (OPEC, Brent); Output (Canada, US);
 - *Infrastructure bottlenecks:* Storage capacity and utilization (*Cushing, OK*); Pipelines (*land to sea*)
 - ✦ **Financial** variables: Paper market liquidity; stress; CIT long positions; “insider” net positions

- **Econometric analysis**
 - ✦ Energy Fundamentals *or* Trading Activity?
 - Which of those variables help predict long run variations in WTI-Brent spreads?


Background: *How Life Was*

4




Fundamentals: *February/March 2007*

5




Fundamentals: *2008 Crisis*

6




Fundamentals: *Political Shocks 2011-2012*

7




Observation: *WTI Futures Expiry is Special*

8




Observation: *WTI Futures Expiry is Special*

9




Observation: *Expiry Issues Matter...*

10




...*But* Something Extra Is Afoot in 2011-2012

11




Background: *Landlocked vs. Seaborne Crudes*

12




Background: *Landlocked vs. Seaborne Crudes*

13




Background: *Landlocked vs. Seaborne Crudes*

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Further Background: *Crude Quality*


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Further Background: *Crude Quality*


16

Quality spread *WTI-WTS* is positive throughout




Further Background: *Crude Quality*

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Further Background: *Crude Quality*

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Remainder of the Presentation

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- ✓ **Provide visual & statistical evidence of breaks in crude oil benchmark price Spreads**
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 - ✦ **Demand**-side fundamentals: World, US
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 - ✦ **Financial** variables: Paper market liquidity; stress; CIT long positions; “insider” net positions

- **Econometric analysis**
 - ✦ Energy Fundamentals *or* Trading Activity?
 - Which of those variables help predict long run variations in WTI-Brent spreads?

II. Structural Break Tests

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○ Structural break tests

✦ Spread decomposition:

$$WTI_1 - Brent_1 = (WTI_1 - LLS_0) + (LLS_0 - BRENT_0) - (BRENT_1 - BRENT_0)$$

WTI-Brent nearby futures spread =

“Landlock” spread

+ “Transatlantic” Spread

+ Brent nearby spread

○ Interpretation?

✦ Statistical approach:

Simple (*deterministic*) time trend in the spread, Look for single break per test

→ Choose date (*based on graphs and known events*), Test for break in mean

Commodity Spreads: Fall 2008

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Hypothesis 1: The Brent-WTI ($BRENT_1 - WTI_1$) spread levels experience structural breaks in late Fall 2008; so does the “landlock” spread ($WTI_1 - LLS_0$). Neither the Transatlantic spreads ($LLS_0 - BRENT_1$ or $LLS_0 - BRENT_0$) nor the West Texas quality spreads ($WTI_1 - WTS_0$ or $WTI_0 - WTS_0$) do.

- Rationale:

- LLS, Brent seaborne → easy to transport/store (*Plante & Yucel '11*)
- Cushing storage OK for sweet&sour (*Pirrong '10, Genscape 2012*)
- WTI landlocked after 2007 (*Cushing bottleneck – Fattouh '07*)
- Recession starts in Fall 2008

Table 1A: Commodity Spreads (*calendar roll*)

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November 2008 Break

	Constant Time Trend	Time Trend With Weekends
--	------------------------	--------------------------------

$Brent_1 - WTI_1$	8.37*** (0.0002)	7.56*** (0.0005)
-------------------------------------	-----------------------------------	-----------------------------------

$WTI_1 - LLS_0$	5.83*** (0.0030)	4.40** (0.0123)
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$LLS_0 - Brent_1$	0.83 (0.4365)	2.58* (0.0759)
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$WTI_1 - WTS_0$	1.83 (0.1611)	0.75 (0.4708)
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Table 1A: Commodity Spreads (*Open Int. roll*)

23

November 2008 Break

	Constant Time Trend	Time Trend With Weekends
--	------------------------	--------------------------------

<i>Brent</i> ₁ - <i>WTI</i> ₁	6.51*** (0.0015)	4.71*** (0.0091)
---	---------------------	---------------------

<i>WTI</i> ₁ - <i>LLS</i> ₀	6.56*** (0.0014)	5.26*** (0.0053)
---	---------------------	---------------------

<i>LLS</i> ₀ - <i>Brent</i> ₁	1.00 (0.3671)	2.71* (0.0667)
---	------------------	-------------------

<i>WTI</i> ₁ - <i>WTS</i> ₀	1.38 (0.2519)	1.17 (0.3120)
---	------------------	------------------

Calendar Spreads: Fall 2008

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Hypothesis 2: The level of the WTI time spread (measured as the slope of the near-dated term structure of crude oil futures prices, net of interest costs) experiences a structural break in Fall 2008. The structural break is less significant for contracts further along the WTI futures maturity curve.

- **Rationale:**

- Cushing storage is limited (*Pirrong '10, Borenstein & Kellog '12, Genscape 2012*)
- Dearth of storage matters

Table 1D: Calendar Spreads (*calendar roll*)

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	November 2008 Break	
	Constant Time Trend	Time Trend With Weekends
$\frac{WTI_2 - WTI_1}{WTI_1}$	5.17*** (0.0050)	5.53*** (0.0040)
$\frac{WTI_2 - WTI_1}{WTI_1} - LIBOR$	6.62*** (0.0014)	7.05*** (0.0009)
$\frac{WTI_3 - WTI_2}{WTI_2}$	3.64** (0.0263)	3.91** (0.0202)
$\frac{WTI_3 - WTI_2}{WTI_2} - LIBOR$	3.86** (0.0213)	4.52** (0.0110)

Table 1E: Calendar Spreads (*Open Int. roll*)

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November 2008 Break

	Constant Time Trend	Time Trend With Weekends
$\frac{WTI_2 - WTI_1}{WTI_1}$	4.81*** (0.0082)	5.22*** (0.0055)
$\frac{WTI_2 - WTI_1}{WTI_1} - LIBOR$	6.37*** (0.0017)	6.02*** (0.0025)

Commodity Spreads: Dec. 2010

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Hypothesis 3: The Brent-WTI spread level experienced a structural break in December 2010.

- **Rationales:**

- **Physical:** Revolution in Tunisia (Dec. 18, 2010)
Fukushima disaster (February 2011)
Libya goes offline (February 2011)
Cushing still “landlocked”
- **Financial:** WTI (*Brent*) weight in S&P GSCI drops (*increases*)
Brent included for 1st time in DJ-UBS

Table 1A: Commodity Spreads (*calendar roll*)

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	December 2010 Break	
	Constant Time Trend	Time Trend With Weekends
<i>Brent</i> ₁ - <i>WTI</i> ₁	8.10*** (0.0003)	4.25** (0.0143)
<i>WTI</i> ₁ - <i>LLS</i> ₀	10.78*** (0.0000)	8.02*** (0.0003)
<i>LLS</i> ₀ - <i>Brent</i> ₁	2.96* (0.0522)	1.77 (0.1712)
<i>WTI</i> ₁ - <i>WTS</i> ₀	0.21 (0.8127)	0.04 (0.9571)
<i>Brent</i> ₁ - <i>Brent</i> ₀	8.09*** (0.0003)	11.45*** (0.0000)
<i>Brent</i> ₁ - <i>WTI</i> ₁	8.14*** (0.0003)	4.69*** (0.0093)
<i>Brent</i> ₁		

Table 1A: Commodity Spreads (*Open Int. roll*)

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	December 2010 Break	
	Constant Time Trend	Time Trend With Weekends
<i>Brent</i> ₁ - <i>WTI</i> ₁	10.98*** (0.0000)	5.85*** (0.0029)
<i>WTI</i> ₁ - <i>LLS</i> ₀	6.94*** (0.0010)	6.01*** (0.0025)
<i>LLS</i> ₀ - <i>Brent</i> ₁	1.28 (0.2781)	0.53 (0.5869)
<i>WTI</i> ₁ - <i>WTS</i> ₀	0.38 (0.6852)	0.55 (0.5787)
<i>Brent</i> ₁ - <i>Brent</i> ₀	11.59*** (0.0000)	17.95*** (0.0000)
$\frac{\textit{Brent}_1 - \textit{WTI}_1}{\textit{Brent}_1}$	9.78*** (0.0001)	4.42** (0.0121)


III. Fundamentals & Financials

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- Evidence on Economic, Infrastructure and Financial Variables linked to Spread
 - ✦ Demand-side fundamentals: World, USA
 - ✦ Supply-side factors:
 - Brent-relevant output capacity (OPEC, Brent)
 - WTI-relevant production (US output + Canadian imports to PADD2)
 - *Infrastructure bottlenecks:*
 - Storage capacity and utilization (*Cushing, OK*)
 - Pipelines (*land to sea*)
 - ✦ Financial variables:
 - Paper market liquidity
 - Stress
 - CIT long positions
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1. Macro Fundamentals: SHIP (World) & ADS (US)


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2a. Oil Supply: Non-Saudi OPEC Spare Capacity

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
Figure 3: Crude Oil Prices and OPEC Effective Surplus Production Capacity



- **Rationale:** matters for Brent once Cushing is landlocked
→ Interact with dummy for directionality of Cushing bottleneck

2b. Oil Supply: Brent Output


33



- **Rationale:** “BFOE” output drops matter, especially if ROW substitutable output is constrained.

3a. Oil Supply – WTI: US Rigs & Canadian Imports


34



- **Rationale:** Domestic output & imports end up in Cushing → glut (e.g., Fattouh '07, Pirrong '10, Borenstein & Kellog '12)

3b. Oil Supply – WTI: Cushing Storage Limits

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


- **Rationale:** Genscape data exist only since 2009 → we use a proxy = slope of the WTI term structure (*Fama-French '88*)

4a. Paper Market: Overall OI (<3 months)

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Figure 7: WTI and Brent Near-Dated Open Interest
(First three Calendar Months)



- **Rationale:** OI is a signal of rising commodity prices (*Hong & Yogo '11*) – different patterns for **WTI (-)** vs. **Brent (+)**

4b. Paper Market: Financial Stress

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○ Theory

- ✦ Arrival of less-constrained traders (value arbitrageurs) should reduce mispricing
 - e.g., Rahi & Zigrand (*RFS* 2009); Başak & Croitoru (*JFE* 2006)
- ✦ Limits to arbitrage
 - Questions about such traders' behavior in periods of market stress
 - Leverage constraints, wealth effects, portfolio rebalancing needs, etc.
 - Kyle & Xiong (*JF* 2001), Gromb & Vayanos (*JF* 2001), Kodres & Pristker (*JF* 2002), Broner, Gelos & Reinhart (*JIE* 2006), Pavlova & Rigobon (*REStud* 2008), ...
 - Our paper: empirical analysis, using energy benchmark spreads

4b. Paper Market: Financial Stress

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○ Empirics

✦ Financial stress should matter – evidence on extreme linkages:


- *Bond-equity* returns extreme linkages in G-5 countries
- *International equity* market correlations increase in bear markets
- *Commodity-equity* linkages went up in Fall 2008

○ Our measure: TED Spread

✦ *Robustness: VIX?*

4c. Paper Market: CIT Long Positions (<3 months)

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- **Rationale:** Commodity Index Traders (CITs) contribute to liquidity (*Büyükşahin et al, 2009; Brunetti & Reiffen, 2011*)

4c. Paper Market: CIT Long Positions (<3 months)

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✦ Source of the data?

- Evidence that *who* trades helps predict oil price spreads
 - In general, difficult to test the theory
 - Unlike most authors, we have access to comprehensive daily data on
 - (i) trader-level (i.e., individual) positions
 - (ii) each trader's main of business & underlying motive for trading (i.e., hedging or not)
 - (iii) over an entire decade (July 2000 to July 2012)
 - The composition of the open interest helps predict an important aspect of the distribution of energy returns

4d. Paper Market: Commercials (<3 months)

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✦ Idea?

- Identify 89 companies linked to Cushing infrastructure
 - Owners of refineries, pipelines, storage, etc. linked to Cushing
 - Related entities
- A majority of those companies hold reportable positions in WTI futures
- Test whether, as a whole, their net short position helps predict the WTI-Brent spread
- Findings: in the aggregate, no predictive power → not reported

IV. Econometric Analysis

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- Evidence on Economic, Infrastructure and Financial Variables linked to Spread
 - ✦ Demand-side fundamentals:
 - World, USA
 - ✦ Supply-side factors:
 - Brent-relevant output capacity (OPEC, Brent)
 - WTI-relevant production (US output + Canadian imports to PADD2)
 - *Infrastructure bottlenecks:*
 - Storage capacity and utilization (*Cushing, OK*)
 - Pipelines (*land to sea*)
 - ✦ Financial variables:
 - Paper market liquidity
 - Stress
 - CIT long positions
 - “Insider” net positions

A. Dependent Variable: *WTI-Brent Nearby Futures Spread* *(calendar-based roll)*

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B. What Predicts the Spread: Trading Activity *or* Fundamentals?

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C. What Really Matters?

ARDL Regressions

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B. Accounting for WTI-Brent Spread

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- Regress the spread on...
 - ...trader **position data**
 - ✦ Each trader category entered separately
 - WTI actual & Brent imputed positions (≤ 3 months)
 - ...**real-sector variables**
 - ...**market stress proxies**
- Technical issue
 - Some series are $I(0)$, others $I(1)$; also, endogeneity?
 - ARDL model, Pesaran-Shin (1999) approach
 - Lagged values of variables to deal with AC and endogeneity

A. Fundamentals Matter

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Economy, Supply side, Cushing (Table 4)

	Fundamentals + Financials + CIT		
	I-FC	II-FC	III-FC
Intercept	-292.839 (259.4)	-202.840 (296.8)	-209.944 (255.8)
TIME	-0.004779** (0.002437)	-0.00319242 (0.002936)	-0.004414*** (0.001524)
SHIP	-0.0493147 (0.03559)	-0.0543983 (0.04083)	-0.0398034 (0.03529)
ADS	0.655218* (0.3543)	0.364546 (0.4378)	0.509077 (0.3543)
SPARE	-0.600090 (0.4885)	-0.638268 (0.5597)	-1.02213** (0.4609)
BFOE	-0.615093 (2.303)	0.586638 (2.663)	1.37549 (2.589)
US STOCKS	-	-	0.0127566 (0.007882)
LAND	-5.92892*** (1.526)	-6.55721*** (1.751)	-4.84989*** (1.696)
LAND x SHIP	0.0542900 (0.03958)	0.0483747 (0.4528)	0.0402615 (0.03886)
Canada Imports	-0.149349** (0.07370)	-0.129496 (0.08416)	-
RIGS	0.00353558 (0.003469)	0.000379972 (0.004503)	-
Cushing STOCKS	-	-	-0.076846 (0.06587)
WTI SLOPE	-	-56.5533* (31.86)	-

Trading Matters! *Expected Signs*

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	Fundamentals + Financials			Fundamentals + Financials + CIT		
	I-FF	II-FF	III-FF	I-FFS	II-FFS	III-FFS
DISCOUNT	213.857 (371.7)	105.619 (411.8)	82.3511 (373.6)	311.057 (259.4)	217.412 (296.8)	200.277 (256.6)
WTI OI	-0.033770*** (0.007096)	-0.030512*** (0.007665)	-0.034574*** (0.00718)	-0.01704*** (0.005352)	-0.016209*** (0.006245)	-0.017398*** (0.005313)
Brent OI	0.043394*** (0.008563)	0.041662*** (0.009393)	0.046081*** (0.008922)	0.027802*** (0.005764)	0.027523*** (0.006622)	0.030197*** (0.005864)
TED	0.678246 (0.7292)	0.577481 (0.8291)	0.561489 (0.7910)	0.888889* (0.4866)	0.802149 (0.5781)	0.746660 (0.5161)
WTI CIT Long	-	-	-	0.173028*** (0.01753)	0.167156*** (0.02037)	0.160408*** (0.01376)
Brent CIT Long	-	-	-	-0.434916*** (0.03677)	-0.413675*** (0.04566)	-0.405326*** (0.03023)
Brent vs. WTI Weights	18.5229*** (2.750)	16.4915*** (3.442)	16.44883*** (2.139)	-	-	-

VI. Conclusion

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Findings

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- **“Breaks”**
 - ✦ Breaks in Fall-2008 and End-2010
 - ✦ *Drivers appear different*
- **“Financialization”**
 - ✦ Increase in overall OI predict increases in the WTI-Brent spread
 - ✦ CIT activity inversely related with relevant component of spread
 - *Liquidity? Causality?*
- **Information on OI composition is relevant**
 - ✦ CFTC decision to disaggregate more – trader type & maturity

Further Work

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- **Technical:**
 - **Out-of-sample predictions**
 - **Causality**
 - **Short-term responses**
 - ✦ Individual traders?
- **Conceptual:**
 - **Storage utilization and capacity constraints**
 - ✦ Longer sample with Genscape data
 - ✦ Physical quantities vs. price signals (slope)

II. Trading Facts

Financialization of Energy Futures Markets

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A. Position Data

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- **Publicly available data**
 - CFTC Commitments of Traders (COT) Reports (Weekly since 1990's)
 - **Highly aggregated**
 - All maturities are lumped together
 - Traders grouped in just 2 bins (*“Commercials” vs. “Non-Commercials”*)
- **vs. Our data: Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS)**
 - **End-of-day positions of every individual large trader (Daily)**
 - ✦ Non-public, CFTC only
 - For every contract maturity
 - Every day from July 1, 2000 to February 26, 2010
 - **Information on each trader's line of business**

Our Detailed Data: Main Sub-Categories (*Oil*)

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- **Non-commercials**
 - **Hedge Funds** (includes Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs), Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs), Associated Persons who control customer accounts, and other Managed Money traders)
 - **Floor Brokers & Traders**
 - **Non-Registered Participants** (Traders not registered under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA); category includes non-MMT financial traders)
- **Commercials**
 - **“Traditional”**
 - ✦ **Producers**
 - ✦ **Manufacturers** (refiners, etc.)
 - ✦ **Dealers** (energy wholesalers, exporter/importers, marketers, etc.)
 - **Commodity Swap Dealers** (includes arbitrageurs and CITs)

B. Measurement Issues

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- **Traders' shares in short-term & long-term contracts**
 - For each category of traders, we get
 - ✦ Share of the total open interest (all contract months)
 - Average of long & short positions divided by open interest
 - ✦ Share of the open interest in first 3 contract months
 - Commodity indices focus on near-dated contract
- **Speculators**
 - Hedge funds?
 - ✦ Register with CFTC → detailed data
 - CITs (Commodity Index Traders)?
 - ✦ Detailed data at quarterly frequency & only since 2008.
 - we proxy their market share by share of commodity swap dealers
 - Best we can do (*Why?*), but imperfect
 - Approximation is better for short-term contracts (why?)
 - Overall importance?

TECHNICAL

Swap Dealing & Commodity Index Trading

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- Overall vs. Near-dated Swap Dealer Positions (% of OI), 2000-2010

